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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890509-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, presided over Appellant Darrin Lamar Pelton's bench trial and 
rendered final judgment and conviction. Mr. Pelton was convicted of 
a second degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Do the actions of Appellant Pelton constitute 
"arrangements11 made in furtherance of the distribution of a 
controlled substance? (i.e. Did Appellant, a man who simply directed 
an agent to a supposed meeting place where they were to wait for an 
exchange, "arrange" the transaction when nothing transpired at the 
(T. 8, 18, 19); Suppression Motion at 34. In any case, Acosta, 
Baker, Pelton, and Acosta's confidential informant then drove 
together to the 7-Eleven (T. 8). Once there, Baker and Pelton 
exited Acosta's car (T. 8). They never made the phone call nor was 
the cocaine ever brought to the location (T. 9, 19, 20). They did 
"[walk] up towards the phone booth at the 7-Eleven" (T. 9) where 
they encountered Paco. However, the prosecution did not prove the 
contents of Paco's telephone conversation (or if he was even talking 
to anyone) nor the discussion apparently entered into between Paco 
and Pelton (T. 27). Pelton then walked to a pickup truck for his 
ride home (T. 20, 33). Pelton had no further involvement or 
discussions with Acosta (T. 20, 26) . 
Meanwhile, Acosta, while still situated at the 7-Eleven, 
had his informant contact Lorraine Coates (T. 9). The informant 
apparently contacted Coates, in person, at the 7-Eleven (T. 9). 
Acosta told Coates that he was uncomfortable with Baker and Pelton 
and did not want them there (T. 22). Acosta then asked if he could 
speak with Paco (T. 9, 22). Coates contacted Paco and told him that 
Acosta wanted to speak directly to him (T. 9). Paco approached 
Acosta at the 7-Eleven and told him to proceed to a gas station on 
1700 South and 1300 East (T. 10, 20). Acosta acknowledged that 
"there [was] absolutely no dispute that Lorraine [Coates] made the 
contact with Paco [who, in turn, contacted Acosta] and Paco made the 
contact with the people in the house on 17th South where the cocaine 
was" (T. 26). Paco, Coates and Acosta's informant then rode with 
Acosta to the gas station (T. 10). 
- 4 -
Shortly thereafter, Paco and Acosta made an agreement in 
which Acosta would give $600 to Paco, who would exchange the money 
at a nearby location for a half ounce of cocaine (T. 12). After 
receiving the money, Paco made several trips from Acosta7s car to 
the house where the money and cocaine were apparently exchanged 
(T. 12, 21, 22). Paco eventually returned to the car with the 
cocaine (T. 12, 21). After receiving the cocaine, Acosta agreed to 
"reward" Coates for arranging the deal (T. 23). No request was made 
by anyone to similarly reward Pelton nor did Acosta agree to reward 
Pelton for his "efforts" in "arranging" the deal. 
Indeed, Pelton had never handled the cocaine (T. 24); 
Pelton never directed Acosta to the house where the cocaine 
transaction took place (T. 24); Acosta never paid Pelton for the 
drugs (T. 24) ; Pelton never discussed cocaine prices with Acosta 
(T. 24); and Pelton never discussed the quantity or quality of the 
cocaine with Acosta (T. 24). Nevertheless, after the drug 
transaction had been completed, Pelton was also arrested and charged 
with arranging the distribution of a controlled substance. 
The testimony of Appellant's mother, Lynn Pelton, indicated 
that Appellant was in need of a ride home and had to rely on others 
for transportation (T. 30, 39). Appellant did, in fact, arrange for 
the ride (T. 19, 20, 33). 
During the aforementioned events, Acosta was wearing an 
"audio intelligence device" which transmitted all the conversations 
to undercover narcotics agent Patrick McCarthy, who was in charge of 
monitoring the recording device. Suppression Motion at 7. However, 
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the tape recordings were never given to Appellant Pelton in 
preparation for his defense. Suppression Motion at 19, 38-39. In a 
proceeding subsequent to his arrest, Appellant moved for a court 
order to either compel discovery of the recordings or, in the 
alternative, suppress Defendant's statements from the trial 
proceedings. Suppression Motion at 4, 26. The trial court denied 
the motion. Suppression Motion at 46. 
Thereafter, during a bench trial tried before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, defense counsel objected to the relevancy and 
admissibility of Exhibit 2, the controlled substance, which had 
never been handled or received by Pelton (T. 28). It was Paco, not 
Pelton, who had directed the agent to the house where the cocaine 
was received (T. 26). Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the 
exhibit into evidence (T. 28). The court subsequently convicted 
Appellant Darrin Lamar Pelton under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-1(a)(ii) 
(Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 1990) for arranging the 
distribution of a controlled substance. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Pelton did not "arrange" the distribution of a 
controlled substance. The facts presented at trial were 
insufficient to establish that Mr. Pelton's behavior rose to the 
level of culpable conduct of other defendants convicted for their 
substantial and necessary role in arranging a drug transaction. At 
present, the statutory definition of "arranging" is boundless. If 
the statutory proscriptions are extended to include the actions or 
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inactions of Mr. Pelton, the scope of the statute would dangerously 
and unconstitutionally encompass completely innocent behavior. 
The drug transaction occurred through the actions of others 
and the "exchange" still would have occurred without Mr. Pelton. 
The undercover agent, once directed to the supposed meeting place by 
Mr. Pelton, grew impatient with the lack of activity and began the 
operation anew by telling his informant to contact the involved drug 
dealers. The agent's voluntary reinitiation of the sting operation 
nullified and superceded any prior "activity" of Mr. Pelton, a party 
with no further "involvement" in the exchange. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court reviews the findings of a bench 
trial, the findings are rejected if they are "clearly erroneous." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). The clearly erroneous 
standard differs from the "sufficiently inconclusive" or 
"insubstantial" jury verdict standard because in the former, the 
appellate court does not simply view the evidence "most favorable to 
the appellee" or resolve all conflicts and inferences "in his 
favor." Compare Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93, with State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). Rather, 
[if] the trial court's verdict in a criminal case 
[is] against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, 
the . . . verdict will be set aside. 
Walker. 743 P.2d at 193. 
In the bench trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
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Appellant Darrin Pelton was convicted under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-1(a)(ii) for "arranging" the distribution of a controlled 
substance. The court made a mistake, however, because the actions 
or inactions of the Appellant clearly fell short of the "arranging" 
activities necessary for a conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
"ARRANGED" TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
The first issue centers around the definition of 
"arranging," as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), 
and whether the actions of the Appellant, Darrin Pelton, were 
improperly included within the proscriptions of the statute. The 
statute states, inter alia, "it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally . . . arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance." Id. "Arrange" has not been expressly 
defined in Utah1 though the prohibited perimeters of this type of 
conduct have been announced in recent decisions. 
1
 See infra subsection B, page 14, 
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A. APPELLANT'S CONDUCT DOES NOT RISE TO THE 
CULPABLE CONDUCT OF OTHER DEFENDANTS CONVICTED 
OF "ARRANGING" THE DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. 
In State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987), the Court 
agreed upon three key activities which, when performed by the 
defendant, constitute facts sufficient to support a conviction for 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance: 
On appeal, the State argues that defendant arranged 
to distribute marijuana for value when he discussed 
the purchase with officers, set a price for the 
marijuana, and agreed to make the exchange. We 
agree. [The statute]2 makes it a crime "to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute . . . a 
controlled substance for value." The undisputed 
evidence clearly proved the elements of this crime. 
Id, at 44. In Renfro, defendant Mark Renfro was properly convicted 
for arranging a transaction based upon the following behavior. Two 
undercover officers spoke with Renfro about purchasing some 
marijuana. Renfro went to another room in his house and returned 
with the drug. "He then agreed to sell marijuana to the officers, 
exchanging four half-ounce bags of the substance for a total of two 
hundred dollars in cash. After the transaction was completed, the 
officers left." Renfro, 735 P.2d at 44. The arrangement was 
undisputed. 
In sharp contrast to the facts of Renfro, however, the 
2
 The State argues that the principles of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953) (repealed 1987) apply to the applicable 
statute here, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) 
(effective until July 1, 1990), because of duplicative phrases and 
meaning (T. 45). See also State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
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evidence at Pelton's trial conspicuously lacked the same factual 
circumstances necessary for a conviction. Not only were the Renfro 
circumstances not proven, the testimony of undercover narcotics 
agent Albert Acosta ironically supported Pelton's innocence. Acosta 
admitted that Pelton never possessed the cocaine; Pelton never 
directed the agent to the house or even discussed going to the house 
where the cocaine was purchased; the agent never paid Pelton for the 
drugs nor were any prices discussed; and Pelton never discussed the 
quantity or quality of the drug with the agent (T. 23-25) (see 
Addendum A which corrects the misstatement that Pelton received 
marked money). These inactions by Pelton establish that he did none 
of the "arranging11 necessary for a conviction. 
Indeed, the "classic case" of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance, State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 
1983), required substantially more affirmative behavior than the 
inactions of Pelton. The defendant in Ontiveros, Victor Ontiveros, 
had asked an undercover narcotics agent if he wanted some 
marijuana. The agent said "yes." Xd. at 104. Ontiveros then made 
"a phone call to see if someone else had any marijuana . . . and 
while he was on the phone told [the agent] that he could get some 
marijuana at $40 for a half ounce. [The agent] agreed and the two 
left for Provo." Xd. Ontiveros directed the agent to a location, 
took $40 from the agent, entered a residence a short distance away, 
and eventually "returned to the car to give [the agent] a plastic 
bag containing marijuana." Id. These facts, while differing 
greatly from the case at bar, clearly "show[ed] that [Ontiveros] 
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acted as the officer's agent in making the purchase from a third 
party." Ontiveros, 674 P.2d at 104. This type of relationship is 
not present in the case at bar3 and would not encompass the actions 
of Appellant Pelton. 
More recently, in State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68 (Utah App. 
1989), the activities performed by defendant Clark on behalf of an 
agent were, again, far greater than the "activities" performed 
3
 Even the principles of agency have definable 
boundaries. For example, in the much publicized murder case, 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986), the Court found that 
Richard Behrens, a long-time friend of defendant Frances Schreuder, 
was not an accomplice to the first degree murder charge when his 
only "intentional aid" was introducing the defendant to a hired 
killer and attempting to procure a gun for her. "Merely introducing 
one acquaintance to another, without more, is not sufficient to 
constitute intentional aid of the magnitude to charge a defendant 
with first degree murder." Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the appropriate standard used in determining if 
Appellant Pelton was an accomplice is whether he "could be charged 
with the same offense as the defendant." Id. In Appellant's case, 
the accomplice analysis would be based on the actions of Lorraine 
Coates, whose activities more closely resemble what prior case law 
has defined as "arranging." If, under Schreuder, Coates would not 
have "arranged" the cocaine sale by merely introducing Acosta to 
Paco, without more, it follows that the actions of Pelton, which 
never rose to the level of an introduction, were also not sufficient 
to constitute intentional aid of the magnitude to charge him with 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance. Appellant 
submits that his "activity," without more and absent the additional 
activities performed by the defendants in Renfro, Ontiveros, Clark, 
and Harrison, would not have shown that he "acted as the officer's 
agent in making the purchase from a third party." Ontiveros, 674 
P.2d at 104. Appellant did not summon Paco at the 7-Eleven; rather, 
Acosta told his informant to contact Coates, who then summoned Paco 
(T. 9). State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1987) ("Under the 
Act, it matters very much what the role of a defendant is in an 
exchange of controlled substances for money"). 
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performed by Appellant Pelton.4 For instance, Clark admitted that 
he and another drug trafficker were "partners." Id. He also 
boasted that the cocaine was "extremely good," that he possessed 
equipment "to rock the cocaine out," and that he had given a dealer 
"two and a half grams of 're-rocked7 cocaine." Id. at 68-69. 
Appellant Pelton did none of these things. 
Furthermore, Clark was so important to the sale that the 
"details of an agreed-upon cocaine transaction were repeated in his 
presence." Id. at 69. Pelton was not present during any 
negotiations. Finally, Clark actually "warned" the agent of a 
tailing car. Id. No such warning ever occurred in Pelton's case; 
Pelton was not even driving (T. 19). Thus, the decision of Clark, 
while extending slightly the factual standards of Renfro and 
Ontiveros, do not reach the insignificant "activity" of Pelton. 
Nor does the decision of State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 
1986), wherein the court alluded to additional agency factors which 
may constitute "arranging" a transaction. 
4
 Appellant questions whether State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68 
(Utah App. 1989), a case involving the distribution of a controlled 
substance, would apply to Appellant Pelton's situation, a case 
involving the arrangement of the distribution of a controlled 
substance. The Clark opinion noted initially that the appeal 
involved the "distribution of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(Supp. 1989)," id., but stated subsequently that the "defendant was 
properly convicted under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) for arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance even though the sale was never 
actually consummated." Id. at 49. The standards for "arrange" and 
"distribution" are different. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(ii) 
(Supp. 1989) (distribution requires a delivery); State v. Ontiveros, 
674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983); State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983). 
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Of particular significance in demonstrating that 
Ontiveros [the defendant in the classic "arranging" 
case] was acting merely as the officer's agent, 
Ontiveros asked the officer to sell him some of the 
marijuana . . . [Other factors include finding] and 
[directing] the officer to another sellerf;] . . . 
simply [making] an accomodation call to see if 
someone else had any[;] . . . [directing] the 
officer to the source and merely [carrying] the 
money for the officer. 
Id. at 134. Again, these facts were not present in Appellant 
Pelton's case. Pelton did not ask Acosta for some of the cocaine 
(T. 24). Pelton did direct Acosta to the 7-Eleven but it was 
Acosta, not Pelton, who initiated the contact with Paco (T. 9). 
Pelton talked to Paco at the telephone booths but Paco remained 
peripheral to the encounter until Coates, at the prompting of Acosta 
and his informant, directed Paco to Acosta (T. 9, 22). Acosta 
admitted, "there is absolutely no dispute that Lorraine [Coates] 
made the contact with Paco [who, in turn, contacted Acosta] and Paco 
made the contact with the people in the house . . . where the 
cocaine was" (T. 26). Pelton made no telephone calls and his 
conversation wtih Paco was not proven to be connected to the 
transaction (T. 27). Also, Pelton did not carry Acosta's money 
(T. 24). 
In short, Appellant Pelton's "activity" does not amount to 
the culpable conduct announced in Renfro, Ontiveros and Clark. In 
departing from, or failing to adhere to this type of "arranging" 
conduct, the trial court declined to follow proper authority and did 
not hold the State to its requisite standard of proof. The court 
clearly erred in its decision. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
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1987); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
B. THE STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION AGAINST "ARRANGING" 
MUST BE REASONABLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFINED 
AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT. 
At trial the State argued for, and the court seemed to rely 
on the application of State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986) 
(T. 46), which held, "any act in furtherance of 'arrang[ing] to 
distribute . . . a . . . controlled substance' constitutes a 
criminal offense pursuant to the statute." Id. at 1321 (emphasis in 
original) (citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1979)); 
(T. 44-46). But the State's reliance on Gray is misguided. 
The Court in Gray based its decision on State v. Harrison, 
601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), wherein the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the predecessor statute to the one in the 
instant action, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953) (repealed 
1987), and consequently affirmed defendant Harrison's conviction for 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance. The Harrison 
decision may have properly upheld the statute's constitutionality, 
but the reasons supporting the decision, if followed, render 
Appellant Pelton's conviction unconstitutional as applied to the 
facts of his case. Cf. Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (an 
ordinance was held unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who 
could not reasonably understand what actions were prohibited under 
the statute). 
In Harrison, the Court first analyzed the applicable 
statute: 
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Except as authorized by this act, it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
• • • 
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute or dispense a controlled substance for 
value or to negotiate to have a controlled substance 
distributed or dispensed for value . . . 
Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added) (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)). The Court disposed of the defendant's 
argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, noting, "[a] 
statute may legitimately proscribe a broad spectrum of conduct with 
a very few words, so long as the outer perimeters of such conduct 
are clearly defined." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923. But the Court 
then defined the proscribed conduct in a vague and all-inclusive 
manner: 
The statute in question accomplishes this [defining 
the proscribed conduct] by specifying that any 
activity leading to or resulting in the distribution 
for value of a controlled substance must be engaged 
in knowingly or with intent that such distribution 
would, or would be likely to occur. 
Id. (emphasis added). By proscribing "any activity," the Court has 
extended the reach of the statute beyond that which is 
constitutionally permissible. The statute does not specify that any 
activity is proscribed. Rather, the statute made it unlawful only 
if a person agreed, consented, offered, arranged, or negotiated the 
distribution of a controlled substance. Clearly, these five 
activities are proscribed. But the definition of each activity and 
the factual circumstances which fall under each activity remains 
unclear. 
The definition of "arrangement" must be clear enough so 
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that "[t]he citizen of average intelligence is left with no 
confusion as to what type of conduct is forbidden." Id. at 923-24. 
Lending little guidance, this standard exacerbates the reference to 
"any act in furtherance" of the arrangement, Gray, 717 P.2d at 1321, 
since both standards leave much confusion for the average citizen. 
Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (who defined pornography as "I know it when I see 
it . . .»). 
For example, if a patron in a restaurant overheard two 
people discussing a drug transaction and the intended meeting place, 
a 7-Eleven, should the patron be convicted for saying, "the quickest 
way to 7-Eleven is Highway 101" or for helping them fix a flat 
tire? Probably not, even though the patron had knowledge and his 
statement or act constituted "any activity" leading to the sale of 
drugs. Average citizens may frown upon or disapprove of such 
actions, but the patron's conduct would not be forbidden. Cf. 
Texas V. Johnson. 491 U.S. , 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 360, 109 S.Ct. 
(1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression 
of an idea [burning the American flag] simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"). 
Moreover, the Harrison Court's analogy to conspiracy is 
inapposite since "conspiracy" is specifically defined. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-201 (1953) . Thus, "any act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy," while not explicitly listed, has definable boundaries 
through the reference to the questioned act. Harrison. 601 P.2d at 
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924. In contrast, since "arrange" is not clearly defined, the term 
"any act in furtherance of an arrangement" also remains undefined. 
Cf. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10, Comment (1988) 
(since the term "impropriety" is undefined, the term "appearance of 
impropriety" is question-begging and not recognized in Utah). 
Therefore, the Harrison decision does not govern the case 
at bar. Even though the statute may be constitutional, its 
application, through the nebulous phrase "any act in furtherance" 
thereof, gives the Appellant insufficient notice of the proscribed 
conduct and makes his conviction improper.5 
C. DARRIN PELTON DID NOT "ARRANGE" THE SALE 
BECAUSE THE TRANSACTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED 
WITHOUT HIM. 
The defendants in Renfro and Ontiveros were key "players" 
who arranged the sale of drugs. Without their involvement, the drug 
transaction would not have occurred. Appellant Pelton, on the other 
hand, was not a necessary party to the sale of cocaine. The 
transaction would have (and, in fact, did) occur through the actions 
of Lorraine Coates, Chris Baker, and Paco. Appellant thus argues, 
in the alternative, that since he did not act in a manner critical 
to the sale's successful completion, he cannot be held liable under 
the statute. The holdings of Renfro and Ontiveros indicate, through 
negative implication, that "but for" the defendant's participation, 
5
 In the alternative, the interpretation has been narrowed 
by the recent decisions noted above and would not encompass the acts 
of Appellant Pelton. 
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a crime would not have occurred. Cf. State v. Renfro. 735 P.2d 43 
(Utah 1987); State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Devlin, 699 P.2d 717, 718 (Utah 1985) (an attempt to distribute case 
in which the "Defendant had the intent to distribute and took a 
substantial step toward the completion of the crime"); State v. 
Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979) (wherein the defendant 
directed the informant to a dealer and explained the desired 
transaction in the presence of all the parties). Here, the drug 
transaction was already prearranged and Pelton's "participation" was 
not required for the sale (T. 22) . 
The alleged beginning of this "sting" operation began with 
a telephone conversation between undercover narcotics agent Albert 
Acosta and Lorraine Coates. Acosta requested some cocaine from 
Coates, who, in order to arrange the sale, contacted an alleged 
cocaine dealer, "Paco" (T. 6, 15). Coates told Acosta to meet her 
at a gas station on 53 00 South Redwood Road (T. 6). 
Acosta drove to the designated meeting place at 53 00 South 
Redwood Road where, instead of meeting Coates, he met Chris Baker 
(T. 7, 16). Baker entered Acosta's car, told him that the cocaine 
could be picked up at an apartment complex at 5600 South and 900 
East, and then rode together with Costa to the complex (T. 7, 17). 
At the apartments, Darrin Pelton approached Acosta and 
entered his car (T. 17-18). Baker moved to the back seat 
(T. 17-18). After the parties introduced themselves, Acosta was 
directed to a 7-Eleven, where they were to wait "for someone to 
bring them cocaine" (T. 19). Baker and Pelton both directed Acosta 
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to the 7-Eleven (T. 22); see also Suppression Motion at page 27, 
lines 7-8 and page 29, lines 14-16 (April 27, 1989 and May 1, 1989) 
(testimony of Patrick McCarthy, the narcotics agent in charge of 
monitoring Agent Acosta during his encounters with the involved 
parties). According to Acosta, Pelton initiated the directions to 
the 7-Eleven after entering the car (T. 8, 19). All three men (and 
Acosta's confidential informant) then drove together to the 7-Eleven 
(T. 8). Once there, Baker and Pelton exited Acosta's car (T. 8). 
Pelton left Acosta's car, spoke to Paco, and went to a pickup truck 
for his ride home (T. 20, 33). Pelton had no further involvement or 
discussions with Acosta (T. 20, 26). 
At this point, the real beginning of the transaction 
occurred. Acosta, while still situated at the 7-Eleven, had his 
informant contact Lorraine Coates (T. 9). The informant apparently 
contacted Coates, in person, at the 7-Eleven (T. 9). Acosta told 
Coates that he was uncomfortable with Baker and Pelton and did not 
want them there (T. 22). Acosta then asked if he could speak with 
Paco (T. 9, 22). Coates contacted Paco and told him that Acosta 
wanted to speak directly to him (T. 9). Paco, at Coates' prompting 
and obviously not pursuant to his prior conversation with Pelton, 
approached Acosta at the 7-Eleven and told him to proceed to a gas 
station on 1700 South and 1300 East (T. 10, 20). Paco, Coates and 
Acosta's informant then rode with Acosta to the gas station (T. 10). 
Shortly thereafter, Paco and Acosta made an agreement in 
which Acosta would give $600 to Paco, who would exchange the money 
at a nearby location for a half ounce of cocaine (T. 12). Paco 
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followed through on the agreement, eventually returning to Acosta's 
car with the cocaine (T. 12, 21). 
In short, Pelton was not a necessary link in the 
aforementioned chain of events. The transaction occurred because of 
Coates, Baker and Paco, or, alternatively, because of Coates and 
Paco. Pelton's involvement stems solely from his reference to the 
7-Eleven and the cocaine. No drugs were exchanged at the 7-Eleven. 
Pelton exited Acosta's car and left for his ride home (T. 20, 33). 
Pelton7s statement may, at best, evidence only his knowledge of the 
transaction. But it does not necessarily prove he actually 
"arranged" the transaction. He should not have been convicted for 
his association with the involved parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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